Arbitral provision in S.C. payday loan not unconscionable

As the Georgia legislature considers whether or not to welcome the payday loan sharks back into the State, residents are crossing into South Carolina for the privilege of paying over 200% interest rates. That's what the borrower did in Crawford v. Great American Cash Advance, Inc., - Ga.App. –, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 925906 (March 29, 2007)... As the Georgia legislature considers whether or not to welcome the payday loan sharks back into the State, residents are crossing into South Carolina for the privilege of paying over 200% interest rates. That's what the borrower did in Crawford v. Great American Cash Advance, Inc., - Ga.App. –, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 925906 (March 29, 2007). The arbitration provision on the loan agreement gave the lender the option of enforcing borrower’s payment obligations through court, which it did. When the borrower tried to counter with a class action and attacked the arbitral provision as unconscionable for lacking mutuality of remedy , among other reasons. Citing Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.2005), the Court rejected lack of mutuality. Moreover, Crawford failed to show that the cost sharing requirement would prohibit her from pursuing her claims. Additionally, she contended that the clause was unconscionable because it is unreasonable to expect borrowers such as her to read and understand the AAA rules incorporated by reference. Court rejected this last contention not only for lack of supporting evidence but also because lack of sophistication will not render the clause unconscionable. Finally, citing the US Supreme Court's Buckeye decision last year, the Court deferred whether the payday loan agreement itself is illegal under Georgia law to the arbitrator.

None of this should be surprising considering the precedent; however, once again I puzzle over this problem: the arbitration clause contained clear language giving the arbitrator jurisdiction over all issues of arbitrability, and yet, the court says this is a matter for the court. Does this ignore Regal Lager, Inc. v. The Baby Club on America, Inc., 2006 WL 3388435 (N.D. Ga.,2006) (arbitrator empowered by parties to decide whether arbitral clause unconscionable for lack of mutuality of obligation)? What about the general rule expressed in First Options (courts decide questions of arbitrability unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to let the arbitrator do so)? The Court does the same thing in Langfitt v. Jackson, - Ga. App. -, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 914330 (Ga.App.), which I review in another post. Anyway,I don't get it.