Thursday, January 10, 2008

New Year Blog about Last Year's Cases

We’ve been working on the 2008 pocket part for the treatise, and several cases struck us as interesting. First, has to be Wilson v. Wilson, --Ga.--, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 4124349 (Ga.), in which the Georgia Supreme Court bent the confidentiality provisions of its own ADR Rules; second, is a couple of opinions from Georgia’s federal courts illustrating how labor arbitration and commercial arbitration standards can be mixed; and, third, is an oddity from our Court of Appeals in which court-connected non-binding arbitration is once again merged somehow with private commercial arbitration.

When private mediations are really court-connected and a new exception to confidentiality --
For mediators and perhaps for ADR practitioners generally, Wilson v. Wilson, --Ga.--, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 4124349 (Ga.) is easily the most interesting case of this year. Mr. Wilson challenged the lower court’s enforcement of a mediated divorce agreement. The first issue was whether the mediation was court-connected, and therefore governed by the court’s ADR rules, or not. The divorce was filed in the Coweta Judicial Circuit, which had adopted a standing order requiring all contested divorce cases to participate in mediation. Mr. Wilson's attorney filled out a form to initiate mediation with the Coweta ADR Program, but due to a request by the attorneys not to schedule the case for mediation “pending further discovery,” the Program Director placed the case on inactive status until hearing back from the attorneys. A couple of months later and without informing the circuit’s mediation center, the parties privately chose a mediator (registered with ODR but not on the center’s list) and reached the mediated agreement without their attorneys present. The Coweta court said it was a private mediation conducted outside of its rules, but the Georgia Supreme Court determined otherwise reasoning that the mediation was initiated by the standing order, the local rules allowed parties to pick ODR-registered mediators not on the court’s list, and the parties did not avail themselves of the procedure to opt-out of the court-connected mediation. The moral of this story is that mediators may think they are handling a private mediation, but if the dispute is in court, that mediation may be “court-connected,” and the mediator should be sensitive to the prevailing rules governing the process.

The sexy issue in Wilson, however, involves confidentiality. During the lower court hearing, Mr. Wilson testified that he wasn’t sufficiently competent to enter into the agreement; however, the mediator was also called to the stand and testified about his general impression that both of the parties had the mental capacity to engage in the mediation and settlement. On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that calling the mediator to the stand violated the confidentiality portion of the agreement to mediate, which provided, “all written and oral communications, negotiations and statements made in the course of mediation will be treated as privileged ... and are absolutely confidential.” Presumably, this also violated the confidentiality provisions of part VII. A. of the Georgia Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules, which provide that mediators cannot “be subpoenaed or otherwise required to testify concerning a mediation,” and is completely contrary to the spirit of Advisory Opinion 6 of the Commission’s Ethics Committee. Relying on an exception to confidentiality in the Uniform Mediation Act (which is not the law in Georgia), the Court rejected Mr. Wilson’s argument and concluded “that fairness to the opposing party and the integrity of mediation process dictate that we create such an exception when a party contends in court that he or she was not competent to enter a signed settlement agreement that resulted from the mediation.” This decision is similar to that made by the court in Olam v. Congress Mortg. Co., 68 FSupp2d 1110, 1137 (N.D.Cal.1999). There are many interesting questions about Wilson, not the least of which is the expertise of mediators to testify as to mental competence, but here’s the one we should be thinking about: When a mediator comes to the “confidentiality” information in the introductory statement, should he or she detail this new exception? It appears so.

Is this labor arbitration?
If you get a chance, read the following cases:
Aldred v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2110720 (C.A.11 (Fla.) (2007), in which the court used both FAA and labor arbitration standards in reviewing an award under a collective bargaining agreement, and Bryant Motors, Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1832016, , M.D.Ga., June 25, 2007), modified by Bryant Motors, Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2422133, (M.D.Ga. 2007), in which the court mixes standards and cases from labor arbitration with the FAA in its analysis on a motion to vacate a commercial arbitration award. Note that the US Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability of the FAA to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. John Allgood makes some informative comments in this regard (see his comments to this post).

Obong Redux
Who can forget that madcap case, Obong v. Ekereke, 216 Ga. App. 59 (1994), in which it was unclear whether the parties had participated in a voluntary binding arbitration or a court-connected mandatory non-binding arbitration? Needless to say, but I’ll say it - the difference is important. The Court of Appeals concluded it was the latter, and the Supreme Court concluded it was the former. Ekereke v. Obong, 265 Ga. 728 (1995). Of course, those were the formative days of Georgia ADR. Now, we have Lowe v. Center Neurology Associates, P.C., --- Ga. App. ---, --- S.E.2d ----, 2007 WL 2822420, in which the court uses the Georgia Arbitration Code for authority in a case that appears to have been referred by the lower court to court-connected mandatory non-binding arbitration, to which the Georgia Arbitration Code would not be applicable. Oops…

3 comments:

Editors said...

I think the federal courts (and the clerks and
non-labor attorney advocates) in general are not always up on
traditional labor laws under the Labor Management Relations Act. They
don't appear to understand that the use of arbitration under the LMRA
developed independently of the FAA standards that have occurred in
employment law cases ("Statutory Rights") in the last 10-15 years. In
general then I don't think they understand Collective Bargaining
Agreements or the grievance procedures that are part of that area.
Section 301 of the LMRA allowed the federal courts to fashion a federal
policy for the enforcement of arbitration provisions in the CBA context.
The federal courts in these arbitration cases are then applying a
national labor policy authorized under Section 301, not the F.A.A. It is
traced to the Lincoln Mills decision, 353 U.S. 448 and the Steelworkers
Trilogy cited below. The standard for review of the Section 301
arbitration awards, however, is similar to the FAA. There is great
deference to the decision of the arbitrator. But the standard is the
Award is entitled to deference only " so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement." Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at
597 See Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 6th ed. , chapter 2.

The federal circuits do not have one uniform standard on what is a basis
to vacate a CBA arbitration award. But all of the circuits impose a high
standard just like under the FAA. I'm going to send you a copy of a
district court order vacating an award under a CBA that we recently
received in the 7th Circuit.

While the Bryant case below is a commercial case, I think some of the
confusion stems from the expansion of arbitration into the Statutory
Rights area where there may be some similar employment matters as under
CBA rights. These statutory rights employment matters are governed by
the FAA. I think the courts are not always aware of the two separate
derivations (1) federal labor (union) law directives in CBA arbitration
cases; and (2) statutory rights. It has never been decided that the FAA
applies in the collective bargaining area. These cases, however, deal
with so many of the same type grievances as employment cases that I
think the two get mixed up. I believe I've also seen courts cite the
labor cases like the Steelworkers Trilogy , 363 U.S. 564, 363 U.S. 574
and 363 U.S. 593 in various commercial decisions dealing with a request
to vacate. In the Bryant case below on page 3 you see the court citing
labor cases but in the context of the FAA. I don't think this is
unusual. Maybe it's because someone does a search on vacation of
arbitration awards and comes up with these cases. Or maybe they are
simply taking the logic fashioned by the circuits under Section 301
labor cases and trying to apply a similar [uniform] standard for review
in the commercial [FAA] arena. I can't say. I believe they could find
better FAA cases that could be part of the analysis without suggesting
confusion with the CBA cases. It seems to go only in one direction,
however. I think when you have a CBA case presented typically by labor
counsel, then you don't get citations as much to the FAA but rather to
the case law under 301. The Avis case, however, does raise this issue
and Jackson Lewis is a traditional Labor firm. Here on page 2 of the
decision is a lengthy reference to the FAA. I wouldn't have made this
argument because the FAA isn't needed based on the federal labor law
policies and case decisions that are in play.

To me it's hard to separate CBA arbitration cases from the overlay of
the National Labor Relations Act and the NLRB standards applied to ULP.
This is a framework that never is engaged in the commercial or statutory
rights areas. At the same time I've thought that one of the reasons the
S. Ct. supported expansion of arbitration of statutory rights was
because they had seen the operation under CBA's of employment grievances
and arbitration awards and they felt it was a good means of resolution.
Employment cases obviously cannot be governed by entirely different
standards of review. In both I do think there is a sensitivity for
procedural standards not found to the same degree as in commercial
matters.

Editors said...

Anonymous comment:

My first quick thoughts are that the decision in this case is very narrow - it seems to validate the existing confidentiality rule in noting with approval that the mediator was not asked to testify to anything substantive, and the decision clearly states that impressions that the mediator has
formed are covered by confidentiality as well. The narrow exception, as I read it, is that the mediator could only testify to his/her impression of
competence where there is no other evidence available. But I agree with xxx and xxx that it creates a slippery slope and opens the door to further encroachment. All in all, I was pretty impressed by the thoughtfulness of the decision and the understanding and appreciation of mediation that it showed...We have to remember that if the Court
makes a ruling on confidentiality, it trumps anything in the ADR Rules. The rules are, after all, the Supreme Court ADR Rules. If the Court wants to adopt the spirit of Olam or the Uniform Mediation Act, it can do that. I don't think legislation adopting the Uniform Mediation Act it needed for the
Court to incorporate its spirit into our rules. The Court is the final decider on the umbrella portions of the rules; any change to that portion of the rules has to be approved by the Court. The only approach to clarification that I can think of is for the Commission to submit an amendment to the confidentiality rule that does some damage control to the Court and let the Court decide.

Editors said...

Another comment about Wilson from Professor Tim Hedeen, Kennessaw:

This is fascinating, really. I'm with Doug, in that the court has
perhaps started down a slippery slope, maybe even through the
looking-glass. The claims by Mr. Wilson are quite consistent with those from Olam case, which was resolved similarly. The court does well to note the UMA's recommendation for in camera consideration of the necessity/value of mediator testimony, as well as incorporating a guideline to keep substantive matters confidential while mediator impressions of competence may be explored. And yet I return to an argument Pat Coy and I made in a 1998 Mediation Quarterly article,

"... we suggest that ... addressing differential cognitive or
emotional abilities of disputants puts mediators in a dangerous and delicate situation. It is dangerous because few, if any, ... mediators are trained in mental health diagnosis and psychological assessment. These analytical
processes are difficult enough for highly trained and skilled
professionals who have ample assessment time with their clients.
Moreover, the potentially negative effects of labeling associated with
psychological and cognitive analysis are serious, even when the
diagnosis may be relatively accurate....

For mediators to pass negative judgments on the cognitive and
emotional abilities of a disputant may easily contradict the ethic of
empowerment that has fueled much of the mediation movement's development."

And so without some screening instrument/process, what value does
the mediator's judgment of competence carry? The mediator's
perceptions of a party's capability play a role during the mediation--that is, if the mediator has concerns about a party's competence, s/he may discontinue the process--but questions of competence raised after the
session (after the execution of an agreement, in this case) seem
ill-advised.
So where to now? Perhaps GODR would do well to consult with the
justices to determine the value of screening by mediators, or perhaps
some of the guidelines offered by Nolan-Haley (1999), Welsh (2001),
Lande (2002) or even Hedeen (2005)... these would include--and I'm quoting myself from Justice System Journal here (what an egotist!):

"2) mediation consent forms should be executed at the outset of
mediation to affirm the disputants* informed consent (per Nolan-Haley,
1999) and understanding of
a) the bounds of acceptable mediator pressure,
b) their rights to terminate mediation at any time, and
c) the court*s policy that nonsettlement will not adversely affect
either party*s case;

3) Welsh*s *cooling-off period* (2001) between the mediation
session and the date any mediated settlements are finalized should be
instituted; and

4) a blanket prohibition on substantive mediator reports and
recommendations to the court should be enforced.

Just as Lande (2002) recommended that a consensus process among
judges,court administrators, mediators, attorneys, and disputants could be used effectively to develop good-faith requirements in mediation, a similar group process would likely be required to clarify and effect some of the changes just outlined."

And so while I'm inclined to consider this much ado about a
little, I believe process protections are subject to slow erosion after the smallest gap has been opened... I recommend
we/GODR/mediators/judges
get together on this sooner than later. [In case you're curious about the articles cited above, the citations are below...]

Cheers,
--Tim

Coy, P. G., and T. Hedeen (1998). *Disabilities and Mediation
Readiness in Court-Referred Cases: Developing Screening Criteria and
Service Networks,* 16 Mediation Quarterly 113.

Hedeen, T. (2005). "Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation:
All Mediations are Voluntary, But Some are More Voluntary than
Others,"
26 Justice System Journal 273.

Lande, J. (2002). *Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote
Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs,* 50
UCLA Law Review 69.

Nolan-Haley, J. M. (1999). *Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking,* 74 Notre Dame Law Review
775.

Welsh, N. A. (2001). *The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?* 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1.